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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

DIANE L.;SPANGLER,

/

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

/
/

-VS-

Case No. 14643
/

MARTIN ALLEN SPANGLER,
/

Defendant and
Appellant.

/

v

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action of divorce brought by Diane L.
Spangler, Plaintiff and Respondent, against Martin A.
Spangler, Defendant and Appellant, wherein action was
joined by the answer of the Appellant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon the hearing held in the lower court, the lower
court granted a judgment of decree of divorce to the
Respondent making a division of the property of the parties
and awarding a judgment of child support as against the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant.
* RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks rehearing on the decree of distribution granted in the lower court by its judgment and in
the amount of child support awarded to the Respondent by the
court, alleging an inequitable distribution of the marital
assets and property and an abuse of discretion by the lower
court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant, who was the Defendant in the lower
i

court, will be referred to in this brief as the "husband,"
and the Respondent, who was the Plaintiff in the lower
court, will be referred to in this brief as "wife."

The

parties were intermarried in 1968 and have a child five
years of age, and the wife is employed as a secretary for
a District Judge in Weber County, (R-3) earning approximately $700.00 monthly (R-27) with an actual net take
home income in the sum of $238.40 every two weeks (R-6),
which computes for an annual take home pay of $6,198.00.
The wife has a further income monthly from rental
property in her name in the sum of $100.00 a month.

(R-8)

The parties both met in 1967, at which time the wife had a
property on Adams Avenue and the husband helped in remodel-2-
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ling of the property by putting in a fence across the back
of the property, gravel in the driveway, carpeting in one
of the apartments, and doing some painting, whereupon the
husband moved into the bachelor apartment upon its completion.

(R-52)
Prior to entering into marriage with the wife, the

husband had acquired a property at 2357 Liberty Avenue,
in Ogden, Utah, which the husband assigned to his wife prior
to the marriage.

(R-53)

The basis of his assigning same

to the wife was belief that she could handle it better and
"I loved her very much."

(R-53)

Shortly after assigning the property to the wife,
the Respondent and Appellant were married, and the husband
performed work upon the Adams property subsequent to the
marriage.

(R-54)

Improvements were also made on the Liberty Avenue property subsequent to the marriage of the parties hereto (R-54),
the husband installing wood panelling in the kitchen of
one of the duplex units of the Liberty Avenue property,
electrical switches, painted the outside of the house, installed a new roof on the premises, and put in a shed;
poured a strip of concrete in the driveway to widen the
driveway; put a new walkway in front of the premises;
remodelled the furnace room by enlarging it and putting
-3-
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in a doorway.

(R-55)

Subsequent purchase made by the husband and wife was
a real estate lot on Harrison Boulevard, which was sold
subsequently for a net profit of $920.00.

(R-14)

On May of 1972, a property was purchased in Willard,
which consisted of an acreage, together with a small cottage
and a garage, which was purchased for $28,000.00. A part
of the Willard property was sold with the retention of the
profits from the sale of the property, the wife had her
father construct a home on the property by borrowing
$7,774.00 as a mortgage, which represented the costs of
materials to build the home (R-17) with the wife having
made an arrangement with her father to pay him one and
one-half times the cost of material, which is one and
one-half times $7,774.00 as and for the father's
labor for construction work of the home constructed on
the Willard property (R-42), which computes out at $11,661.00
as and for the labor and services of the wife's father.
The value of the completed home and the cottage was stipulated
by the husband and wife to be valued at $33,000.00.

(R-19)

During the entire eight years of the marriage between the husband and wife, the wife kept all real property
in her own name.

(R-27)

In the division of the assets by the court, the court
awarded to the husband the sum of $1,500.00, as and for the
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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husband's share of the equity of all the real property,
furniture and equipment of the parties, and all the property, real and personal, was awarded to the wife with $1,500.00
becoming due to the husband upon the child reaching majority,
or the Plaintiff remarrying, or the property being sold.
(R-80)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DIVISION OF ASSETS EVIDENCE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
During the entire marriage of the parties, the wife
at all times handled all records and bookkeeping, wrote all
the checks, and filed the income tax, and paid all bills.
(R-57)

The husband testified that he was working as a

structural steel worker, and such work required a great
amount of traveling from job to job, and also while the
husband was not learned in books, having gone only to high
school (R-56), the wife had attended two years of college,
and was also engaged part time in the sale of real estate.
(R-53)
Throughout the entire transcript and the testimony of
the wife, she continuously referred to all of the property as
"her" property.

The record before the court also shows in

Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, that from the home on Adams Avenue
and the Liberty property, which was given to the wife by the
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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husband, that the wife had a net income and/or profit of
$12,300.00 as and from that property, and the wife testified
that between the summer of 1973 and June of 1975, the husband
did not contribute any direct money to the payment on the
house, mortgage, or otherwise, whereas the record reveals
the income of the husband and wife as follows:
! Wife testified that she had no earnings in 1971,
and that the husband earned $5,289.00, in addition to which
he drew unemployment insurance.

(R-25)

Husband contributed wages in 1972, $9,157.00, plus
unemployment insurance, and the wife contributed $1,002.00.
(R-21)
The husband contributed wages in 1973 of $11,853.00,
and the wife had earnings of $180.00.

(R-21)

The husband contributed earnings in 1974 in the
amount of $16,874.00, and the wife had earnings of $2,765.00.
(R-21)
The husband fell while on structural steel work and
suffered injuries, including a broken hand, torn cartilage
and dislocated disc in the back, and a sprained spine, in
December, 1974, drawing payment of some Workman's Compensation,
Unemployment Compensation, and G. I. Bill payments for education; in addition to which the husband attempted to get back
into steel work and making $3,000.00 in an eight week period
on a job in Wyoming, which in accordance with the defense
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Exhibit No. 11 shows income for 1975 in the amount of
$9,570.00, and the wife alleged the income earned in 1975
in the amount of $2,513.00.

(R-22)

The husband testified that while on all of those
construction jobs, that he sent his pay checks home either
by Western Union, or cash, or check (R-24), that the husband
always sent home everything that he could, varying from none,
when no employment checks, to $700.00 to $1,000.00 or more.
(R-63)

The husband maintained no private records, and

in direct answer to a question as to who handled all the
transactions, the husband replied as follows:
ANSWER - by husband. I was traveling on construction and I sent it home. She has the
records of the checks, she writes the checks,
handles the book work, files the income tax,
handles the real estate property, pays the
bills. I don't have - - I wouldn't - - I
couldn't carry the paper work around with me
when I was working construction. I kept
nothing except my clothes and tools. (R-57)
Following the injury of the husband while on structural
steel construction in Bismark, North Dakota, in the Fall of
1974, (R-57), he again attempted to work on steel structural
construction in Wyoming and again "froze on the steel and
got hurt * * and ended up in the hospital again." (R-59)
The husband no longer works in steel work and will attempt
to seek rehabilitation going back to his original work, which
was that as a barber (R-59) with the expectations of earning
-7-
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from forty to eighty dollars a week at the business.
The husband having put the Liberty property in the
name of his wife, because of his belief that she had greater
ability as a real estate person than himself, this property
was subsequently sold for a substantial profit.

The amount

of labor expended by the husband on the Adams property, which
i
was the property of the wife prior to marriage, but upon
which the husband expended a great deal of work and money
and materials, as was set forth hereinabove previously; the
use of the husband's income as against the income evidenced
by the wife's own testimony, as has been hereinabove
set forth; all evidence that there had to be a community
property of the husband and wife's used in the purchase of
the properties which resulted in the profits that were
made and which were plowed back into the Willard property.
The Defendant's Exhibit 10 further shows an expenditure of approximately $4,539.00 in money by the husband on
the Willard property, in addition to whatever use of wages
that the wife had previously retained, which was sent home
by the husband, as having been invested in the Willard
property, plus the testimony of the wife when she claims
that a mortgage in the amount of $7,706.74 was the total
cost of materials, that her oral contract and agreement
with her father for labor was to pay him one and one-half
-8-
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times the cost of material as and for his work (R-42), which
computes at $11,661.00, was disregarded by the court in
computing the court's own formula for an award of equity
to the husband, wherein the court came up with a figure of
$14,400.00 as a deductible item allegedly owed by the
wife to her father for labor allegedly performed upon the
premises (R-83), when the pure mathematical computation
show that one and one-half times the cost of materials of
$7,774.00, as $11,661.00, and not $14,400.00.

(R-42)

The mortgage balance on the home and rental properties at Willard show a balance in the amount of $7,095.00,
in which the court added the $14,400.00 figure allegedly
due to the wife's father for labor, and interpreting a part
of seven to eight thousand dollars of invested monies in
the Willard property as being that of the wife's only, subtracting same from the accepted figure of $33,000.00 appraised
value of the property, the court then claimed that left a
$3,000.00 equity in which the husband would get $1,500.00.
(R-84)
The mathematics are directly contradictory to
the evidence in the record before the court, and is in
complete disregard of the proportionate earnings of the
husband and wife which has been previously set forth
hereinabove.
In the case of Woolley v. Woolley, 195 P.2d 743,
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Supreme Court of Utah (June 1948), this court held that
when the husband is not in at fault, that the one-third
to the spouse and two-thirds to the husband is a fair
division of the property of the marital estate.
In the instant matter before the court, the husband did not desire divorce and did not seek the divorce,
but was instituted by the wife (R-2), and in addition, the
wife requested that the divorce be effective immediately
upon being decreed,

(R-23)

This court further held in Rackham v. Rackham,
230 P.2d 566, Supreme Court of Utah (April 1951), that
in considering the division of the property, that the ill
health or unemployment of the spouse is a matter to be
considered.
It is submitted to this honorable court that at
the time of the divorce, the husband was not only unemployed,
but could no longer worked on steel work because of his
physical injuries and was hopeing to enter into his earlier
profession of that of a barber wherein the earnings would be
very nominal (R-59); that the only possessions that the
husband had were some construction work clothes, and that
he was not eligible for Unemployment Compensation nor Workman's Compensation, and had lost his Ford vehicle by repossession (R-66) while the records shows that the wife is
-10-
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employed as a secretary earning approximately $700.00 a
month (R-5) and having rental income from the Willard property.

(R-44)
In Anderson v. Anderson, 18 Ut.2d 286, 422 P.2d 192,

this court stated:
The court's responsibility is to endeaver to
provide a just and equitable adjustment of
their economic resources so that the parties
can reconstruct their lives on a happy and
useful basis. In doing so, it is necessary
for the court to consider, in addition to the
relative guilt or innocence of the parties,
an appraisal of all of the attendant facts
and circumstances; the duration of the
marriage; the age of the parties; their
social position and standards of living;
their health; considerations relative to
children; the money and property they possess
and how it was acquired; their capability and
training and their present and potential
income.
It is submitted to this honorable court that application of the standards set by the court in the Anderson case
supra and the present matter before the court, would have
resulted in at least a fifty percent division of the
community assets to the husband even accepting the alleged
oral agreement between the wife and her father as to
monies due and owing to him for labor and disregarding
the monies contributed by the husband and labor expended
by the husband in the construction and remodelling of the
Willard properties, and in his monetary and labor on the
previous properties, plus the fact of the transfer of the
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Liberty property to the wife by the husband.
This court in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697, in
setting forth the standards of the lower court in evaluating
the equitable distribution of the marital estate of the
parties did again place the onus of the party causing
the breakup of the marriage as a fact to take into coni
sideration and in stating that the trial court has a
responsibility in formulating a divorce decree to provide
a just and equitable adjustment of economic resources so
that the parties might reconstruct their lives on a happy
and useful basis.
In the instant matter before the court as of the
time of the decree, we have a husband who is no longer
employable in structural steel work or any heavy type of
labor work because of the injuries which he suffered, who
was unemployed, who is not eligible for either Workman's
Compensation or Unemployment Compensation, and who had to
start a new career again in the only work which he felt he
was capable of performing because of educational and previous
training, and that would be in barbering, from which he testified previously that he would expect to earn about fifty to
eighty dollars a week when eligible to again become a
barber, and the court by decree ordering the husband to
pay $75.00 a month child support while unemployed, and
-12-
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$135.00 a month upon obtaining employment that earned
$400.00 or more, which order can only result in the wiping
out of the meager $1,500.00 awarded by the court to the
husband as his equity in the marital property, or further
actions to use the contempt powers of the court if the husband should be delinquent in making child support payments.
| At the same time, the court also awarded to the wife,
who is earning $700.00 a month plus rental from the
community marital property, $300.00 in attorney fees to
be paid by the husband.

(R-106-108)
CONCLUSION

It is submitted to this honorable court that there
has been an abuse and discretion of the court in refusing
to recognize the specific mathematical basis given by the
wife for the division of the equity of the Willard property,
and for not taking into consideration the contributions of
the husband as to earnings and wages, labor and materials
expended upon the property of the marital community, and
further by imposing upon the husband an immediate award of
$75.00 a month child support, plus $300.00 attorney fees,
when he is totally unemployed, unemployable, and without
resources and under a serious physical disability at the
same time that the wife is enjoying a substantial salary
plus rental income, and the benefits of a practically paid
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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'••h all of the furniture and appliances being
for home, with all ox
awarded to the wife.
Respectfully submitted,

PETE N. VLAHOS, ESQ
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellant
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah
84401
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